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The hospitality industry (especially the restaurant segment) has a histori- 
cally high rate of financial failures. Yet, financial failure in the industry has 
not received the attention it deserves. In this article, the authors identify 
basic reasons underlying failed ideas while presenting a study of several 
hospitality chains that have experienced varying degrees of financial failure. 
The characteristics and pitfalls of these companies provide the necessary 
groundwok to explore major lessons to be learned which should aid hos- 
pitality management to avoid future business failures. 
Each year a significant number of hospitality firms close their 
doors. Generally, food servidrestaurant companies experience a 
higher rate of failure than do lodging companies. Unfortunately, the 
statistics that are available can be somewhat misleading since they are 
composed of only those businesses that have filed for bankruptcy. The 
figures do not include businesses that have closed, but have been able 
to pay off their debts. Nor do they include companies that have been 
able to resolve their hancial di£Ficulties and continue in business.' 
In 1986 the failure rate per 10,000 listed concerns (Dun's Census 
of American Business) for eating and drinking places was 142. During 
the same period, the failure rate for the lodging industry was 65. In 
1987 there was a slight decrease in the failure rate for both segments. 
Eating and drinking places experienced a failure of 91 per 10,000 listed 
concerns, while the failure rate for hotels was 62 per 10,000 listed con- 
cerns.= 
Failure is defined by Mbster as "the state of fact of being lacking 
or insdicient (YBUing short')." Failure does not necessarily result in 
the dissolution of a business. In an economic sense, failure means that 
a firm's revenues do not cover costs. At the other extreme, there is insol- 
vency in bankruptcy when the company's net worth is negative (i.e., 
liabilities exceed the appraised value of company's assets). In between 
there exists an entire range of possibilities which may be temporary 
and subject to remedy, but if not corrected, could lead to the dissolution 
of the business. 
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Table 1 summarizes the three basic types of financial or business 
fdm. 
Table 1 
Types of Financial Failures 
Term Definition Source 
Economic Failure Occurs when a company's costs Arthur J. Keown 
exceed its revenues or that the John D. Martin 
internal rates or return on its Wfiam Petty 
investments are less than its cost of David E Scott 
~apital .~ Basic fiancial 
Management 
Technical Insolvency Occurs when a business cannot pay A&ur J. Kmm, et al 
its obligations. The book value of its B a s i c f i a n d  
assets may exceed its liabilities, Management 
indicating positive net worth, but the 
company does not have sufficient 
liquidity to pay its debts. The Lawrence J. Gitrnan 
business may be able to escape Principles of 
total fail- if it can convert some &agerial Flnance 
of its assets into cash within a 
reasonable time.*J 
Occurs when the company's Arthur J. Keown, et al. 
liabilities are actually greater than BasicHmmcial 
the fair market valuation of its Management 
assets, indicating negative net 
worth. The firm is totally unable to 
meet its maturing obligations. This 
situation generally indicates that 
liquidation or dissolution rather 
than reorganization of t h e h  is 
necessary? 
Just as there are various degrees of failure, there are also a 
number of remedies available to an organization in financial distress. 
These solutions may be applied voluntarily or involuntarily. Most vol- 
untary remedies are applied by the business without court or trustee 
supervision of the settlement. 
Table 2 
Types of Voluntaryflnvoluntary Solutions To Financial Failures 
Term Definition Source 
Extension A b ' s  mditors agree to Charles W. Haley 
postpone debt payments for a Lawrence D. Schall 
specitied time period in order Introduction to 
to mitigate the firm's problems.' fiancial Management 
Composition A W s  creditors agree to Charles W. Haley 
receive less than the amount Lawrence D. Srhall 
originally owed to them.8 Intmdudion to 
fiancial 
Management 
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Term Definition Source 
Quasi-reomation Occurs when a firm modifies 
its capital structure. This 
m&cation usually involves 
writing off a deficit against 
additional paid-in capital; 
duction in the par value of 
the company's common stock, or 
write-down of overvalued assets. 
Aquasi-reorganization permits 
a company to regain ita poeition 
as a pmfitable business without 
the stigma associated with large 
deficits or continuous operating 
lessee? 
Chapter 11 This remedy is applied under 
~ankruptcy Reform court supervision. Usually 
Act of 1978 the debtor remains in possession 
of and continues to operate the 
firm while working out a plan 
to settle the company's obliga- 
tions. Chapter 11 permits these 
negotiations to be conducted 
directly among the debtor, 
&torn and etodrholders.1° 
Chapter 7 This is an involuntary solution. 
Bankruptcy Reform It is applied in situations 
Act of 1978 where it has been determined 
that a fair, equitable, and 
feasible basis for reorgan- 
ization does not exist. The 
business is liquidated or dis- 
solved in an orderly manner. 
Any proceeds h m  the sale of 
the asseta are distributed to 
creditors first. Any residual 
proceeds are then distributed 
to the shareh~lders.".~ 
E. John Larsen 
k M. Mosich 
Intermediate 
Accounting 
Glenn G. Munn 
Encplopedia 
ofBankmgand 
f i ance  
Lamnce J. Gitman 
Principlesof 
Managerial 
liInance 
John D. FInnerty 
corporate 
fiancial 
Analysis 
There are many reasons leading to business failures, particularly 
restaurant failures. Studies show that only 10 percent of all failures 
are directly attributable to acts of God, neglect, or dishonesty on the 
part of management or owners. Some reasons for failure include poor 
execution, ego of the founder, undercapitalization, non-diversification, 
abandonment of a successful concept, inadequate manager andlor em- 
ployee training, poor upkeep of the property, too rapid expansion, in- 
adequate internal controls, reliance on a gimmick theme, poor site 
selection, and inadequate market analysis. 
W will now examine several different companies that have experi- 
enced varying degrees of financial failure. 
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Wendy's International, Inc. 
Wendy's was recently rated number five in the Nation's Restaurant 
News Top 100 Chains ranked by system-wide sales. Annual system- 
wide sales as of August 1988 were $3 billion. Rndy's was also ranked 
number five in this survey in the market share category. In the ham- 
burger chain segment, Wendy's is currently ranked fourth in system- 
wide sales, third in number of units with 3,950, and eleventh in sales 
per unit.'3 
Kndy's concept is based on freshly-ground ("hot off the grill") 
hamburgers garnished with the customers' choice of toppings. Al- 
though it has been considered adult oriented, the company has in- 
creased its efforts to attract the "family" market. 
In the past Kndy's was considered one of the best chain operators. 
Management would thoroughly study an idea before implementing it. 
Initially, things were kept simple. In order to keep capital costs down, 
Mkndy's built smaller units and purposely planned to do most of its 
business through the drive-thru window. The company also made a 
conscious decision not to complicate the menu with a large variety of 
items. Hamburgers, fixed a number of ways, were the key to success. 
Additionally, during the early years, Wendy's was able to get greater 
productivity out of store crews than either McDonald's or Burger King. 
As a result of these basic philosophies, Wendy's was considered a suc- 
cess from the opening of its first store in 1969 through the end of 1984. 
However, in 1985, deviation from the basic concept and some basic bus- 
iness practices began to negatively affect the company's performance 
for the first time in 15 years. 
In 1983, the company had a net income of $55.2 million. The profit 
margin was 8 percent and Return on Equity (ROE) was 19 percent. Re- 
venues increased to $720 million, up 19 percent and system-wide sales 
increased to $1.92 billion, up 18 percent. The company attributed its 
inc~ased  profitability to the opening of 95 additional (both foreign and 
domestic) company-owned units, increased real sales volume, and, to 
a lesser degree, increased prices. Several new menu items such as the 
bacon cheesebwger, an upgraded salad bar, and a "hot stuffed " baked 
potato helped stimulate sales. Additionally, the cost of sales decreased 
during the year as a result of increased operating efficiencies, lower 
beef prices, and a change in the product mix. 
In 1984, net income increased to $68.7 million. The profit margin 
remained steady at 8 percent, but ROE increased slightly to 20 per- 
cent. Revenues increased to $944.7 million, up 31 percent, and system- 
wide sales increased to $2.42 billion, up 26 percent. Again, the com- 
pany attributed its success to the opening of additional company- 
owned units14, increased real sales volume, and an increase in prices. 
The unusual success of its 'Where's the Beef?" TV commercials was 
also very important. The company introduced a new daypart (break- 
fast) and extended its hours of operation to include late night service. 
Breakfast was becoming the fastest growing daypart in the fast food 
segment at this time. The company also implemented computerized 
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cash registers which improved operating efficiency and cash controls. 
Management personnel and crew depth were also increased. 
Several Factors Contributed To Financial Failure 
In 1985, Rndy's net income was $76.1 million and the highest 
level of earnings achieved in the company's 16-year history. &venues 
were up to $1.126 billion, an increase of 19 percent, and system-wide 
sales increased to $2.69 billion, up 11 percent. During this year 
Vkndy's opened 200 additional company-operated units. The profit 
margin and ROE both decreased slightly to 7 percent and 19 percent, 
respectively. This slight decline was attributed to the softness in the 
economy and lower discretionary spending by consumers. In addition, 
the breakfast program generated less than anticipated sales. Break- 
fast menu items were not finger foods, easily served and eaten on the 
go. Costs associated with the program (advertising, labor, etc.) also in- 
creased as a result of increased its use of couponing during this period 
to protect its market share and remain competitive. Coupon expenses 
increased to 1.7 percent of sales compared to .7 percent in 1984. Addi- 
tionally, Wendy's introduced a 'light" menu in response to the growing 
popularity of low-calorie and healthy foods. 
In 1986, Wendy's sustained a net loss of $4.9 million, the first in 
the company's history. The profit margin was less than 1 percent and 
ROE was negative. Revenues increased by 1 percent, totaling $1.14 bill- 
ion. System-wide sales increased to $2.7 billion, up 2 percent. Manage- 
ment continued to blame softness in the restaurant industry for the 
poor results. The company also blamed increased competition for the 
erosion of sales related to some products and dayparts. In addition, 
Wendy's increased couponing in response to competition. Coupon ex- 
pense increased to 2.6 percent of sales in 1986, as compared to 1.7 per- 
cent in 1985. Wendy's also took a $51.8 million restaurant realignment 
charge (this include write-down of assets and estimated losses until 
the units were disposed of) for the disposition of 164 marginal or unpro- 
fitable company operated units. These units were to be franchised or 
closed. The company also repurchased 744,000 shares of its stock for 
$9.9 million. During 1986, the company introduced Wendy's Big 
Classic which was designed to refocus attention on its primary prod- 
uct, the hamburger. Baked potatoes, breakfast, and salad bars had 
clouded its hdamen ta l  product. 
In 1987, Wendy's earned a profit of $4.5 million. The profit margin 
remained a t  less than 1 percent, but ROE increased slightly to 1 per- 
cent. Retail sales declined slightly during this year to $987.7 million, 
down from $1.036 billion in 1986, due to lower sales per unit. In addi- 
tion, Wendy's introduced the "SuperBar" concept, an "all you can eat" 
hot and cold food bar featuring salad items, Mexican food items, and 
Italian pasta items. Food costs also increased as a result of this pro- 
gram. Additionally, implementation of the SuperBar requires a $25 
thousand per unit capital investment. Couponing also increased for 
the third straight year, costing the company 3.2 percent of sales in 
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1987, as compared to 2.6 percent in 1986. Wendy's implemented sub- 
stantially all of its re-ent program. 
One of the primary reasons for this companys financial problems 
was deviation from the companfs basic concept, freshly-ground bur- 
gers. Wendy's attempted to increase its market share by broadening 
the menu; in doing so, they began to lose touch with a successful for- 
mula. In most surveys the consumer generally rates Wndy's hambur- 
gers better than the competition. 
Another reason for the company's distress was its breakfast con- 
cept. In mid-1985 Wendy's tried to take advantage of the growing b d -  
fast market by introducing a "cooked-border" breakfast menu. How- 
ever, the company was misguided in its attempt. The menu that was 
developed was not fhger food; it couldn't be eaten in the car or at the 
desk. Instead, the customer was forced to sit down in the restaurant 
and eat his meal with a fork and knife. The menu was also considered 
very expensive, labor intensive, and operationally slow. 
The heavy use of couponing or discounting also a f f k t d  Wndy's 
financial performance. Beginnjng in 1985, the company increased its 
reliance on coupons and discounts to stimulate sales, protect its mar- 
ket share, and respond to the use of coupons by cornpetitow, 
McDonald's and Burger I b g .  However, discounting did not stimulate 
sales to any measurable degree. Couponing rarely provides more than 
a short-term boost to revenues. 
In spite of a declining hancial position and a poor operating per- 
formance, Wndy's used funds of $22.9 million in 1987 and $19.9 mil- 
lion in 1986 for the payment of dividends. As a result of dividend pay- 
ments and stock repurchases, Kndy's financial position weakened 
further. 
Turnaround Strategies Irn- 
Wndy's f d s  into the category of an economic failure, that is, fail- 
ure to continue its great success. 
Wndy's has implemented several strategies to turn its financial 
situation mund, including returning to an emphasis on its primary 
product, the hamburger, with the introduction of wndy's Big Classic. 
In addition, the company is currently testing smaller (2 02.) and low- 
priced hamburgers and cheeseburgers in some markets. Its "Ham- 
burger television commercials are helping ref- attention on 
Wndy's hamburgers. 
In the first quarter of fiscal 1986, h d y ' s  decided to make break- 
fast an optional menu item. Most of the domestic company and franch- 
ise stores discontinued the program. Although Wndy's management 
indicated in its 1986 Annual Report that it was working on a number 
of bmakf"  variations, the immediate emphasis was on the ham- 
burge~. 
%ndy's has also s l d  the gmwth of its companyamed units 
which resulted in reduced capital spending. Rather than opening a 
large (100 + ) number of restaurants each year, the company plans to 
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continue its emphasis on improving operations in existing units, and 
on completion of image enhancement programs, and also plans to re- 
duce its ownership of stores. In the past, Wendy's maintained owner- 
ship of 36 percent of total units. Large scale development and interna- 
tional development will be handled primarily through franchising. 
Another turnaround strategy implemented by the company was 
a reorganization a t  the corporate level eliminating over 400 positions 
in 1987. Several layers of management between the top levels and field 
operations were eliminated as well as other administrative programs 
that did not effectively support restaurant operations. The franchise 
area director's staff was increased to provide more one-on-one assist- 
ance to franchisees. Critical to future success, the franchise system is 
in disarray. Many failed and others are well behind in license pay- 
ments. Decision-making has been decentralized somewhat and restau- 
rant managers are being held more directly accountable for running 
their units. These changes should result in a reduction in Wendy's ad- 
ministrative and general expenses. 
The SuperBar, another turnaround strategy, is designed to set the 
company apart from direct competition with McDonald's and Burger 
Kmg. According to Wendy's officials, the SuperBar has broadened its 
customer base by attracting new customers, more families, and more 
dinner and weekend business. Recently, Wendy's announced plans to 
test the viability of adding Chinese food and pizza to the SuperBar to 
keep customer interest s t i m ~ l a t e d . ~  The SuperBar is a high risk strat- 
egy, due to capital costs, but a needed gamble. 
The turnaround strategies have begun to take hold and have re- 
sulted in a steady improvement in overall performance. For the second 
quarter of fiscal 1988, profits increased to $9.6 million, nearly five 
times the profits for the same period in 1987.16 
Wendy's Has Earnings Rebound 
In the September 12,1988, issue of Nation's Restaurant News, sev- 
eral financial analysts indicated they believe Wendy's is once again on 
its way to being a viable and successful company. According to Caroline 
Levy of Shearson Lehman Hutton, who changed her rating of Wendy's 
stock from "sell" to "accumulate," "the stock represents good value 
based on its potential earnings momentum."17 Her view reflects her 
confidence in the turnaround strategies implemented by Wendy's, 
which are supported by improving profit margins, finances, and some 
store sales. At company store levels operating margins have improved 
by 5 percent over the previous year due to better operational controls, 
a sigrdicant reduction in couponing, and lower food costs. 
Accorcimg to Becky Barfield of First Boston in New York, "the 
strong earnings rebound represents some recovery of sales and s i d -  
icant operating improvements. It appears that Wendy's earnings out- 
look is improving.18 
Despite these positive opinions, some analysts remain cautious 
about the company's turnaround. There is concern that the SuperBars 
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am cannibdizhg core menu sales since same store sales and real sales 
haw only sustained moderate inmases since their introduction. Some 
analysts estimate that the sale of non-SuperBar menu items has actu- 
ally deweased by 20 pemnt since the introduction of this new item. 
h d n g  to Jay Freedman of Kidder, Peabody and Co., there are 
two major obstacles in the way of a complete recovery by Wndy's. 
"Fht, the company's SuperBar remains u n p m n  ... the company must 
find ways to keep customers interested once the novelty wears 
The second obstacle pertains to Wndy's franchise system, which Freed- 
man saya remains weak, 18 percent of franchise royalties are still in 
anears. 
Most analysta are taking a "wait and seen attitude on Wndy's be- 
muse, although the company is beginning to see some tangible results, 
progress is not yet strong enough to warrant a strong or attractive stock 
rating.20Mndy's stock is only nominally above its 1988 low for the year. 
Victoria Station 
Victoria Station is the next example of a restaurant company that 
has experienced financial problems. However, this company's financial 
difliculties were much more serious than the previous example. 
Victoria Station was conceived as a medium-priced, limited menu 
(initially only six entrees were offered) restaurant featuring prime rib 
served in old railroad boxcars which functioned as the dining rooms. 
This theme, boxcars and old railroad memorabilia, was used for all the 
company's restaurants. The concept was designed to appeal to singles, 
couples, and families who were looking for good quality food at reason- 
able prices.21 
The company opened its fht restaurant in San Francisco, Califor- 
nia, in April 1969. By the end of 1978, Victoria Station had 97 restau- 
rants in operation. These restaurants were all company-owned since 
there were no franchises. In 1986, as a result of its various financial 
problems, Victoria Station had 39 restaurants in operation. 
During its first decade the company was very successful. However, 
in 1980 the kancial picture began to change. 
Financial Failure Sets In 
In both 1980 and 1981, Victoria Station suffered operating losses. 
However, in 1982 the company was able to achieve a small profit due 
to halted expansion, reorganization of management, and tightening 
cost controls. The profit margin was 1 percent and the return on equity 
was 3 percent. This proved to be the last profitable year for Victoria Sta- 
t i ~ n . ~ ~  
In 1983, the company suffered a loss of $8 million. Both the profit 
margin and mturn on equity were negative. Sales declined from 1982 
by $11.6 million, resulting primarily from a decline in customer counts. 
Poor economic conditions were also blamed as well as an increase in 
expenses as Victoria Station attempted to reposition itselfz3 It is in- 
teresting to note that all our failure examples cite poor economic condi- 
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tions for the onset of their problems. Yet, in all cases there were success- 
ful competitors in those same markets. 
In 1984, mctoria Station's loss was $5.76 million. Again, both the 
profit margin and return on equity were negative. Sales also declined, 
but not at  the same rate as the previous year. They decreased by $7.5 
million. 24 
In 1985, the company's loss was $5.25 million, and sales decreased 
by $8.4 million.26 
In 1986, the worst year experienced by Victoria Station, the loss 
was $35.42 million and sales decreased by $19 million from the previ- 
ous year. While there were other contributing factors, most of the losses 
over this five-year period were attributed to the sale of restaurants and 
a drop in customer counts. Losses in 1985 and 1986 were also attri- 
buted to the failure of "Bonkers," a gourmet hamburger restaurant. 
Victoria Station allocated funds from its dinner house market to 
develop this new concept and penetrate a new market segment.26 
One of the major reasons for this company's failure was too rapid 
growth. Vidoria Station's unit expansion was undercapitalized as well. 
The company, like so many others, felt the pressure from Wall Street 
to keep growing and increasing earnings. Many of the sale and lease 
back arrangements the company entered into in order to finance its 
growth were more costly than its original investment in the properties. 
Another aspect affecting the companfs growth was the fad that it did 
not fmchise, thus it was highly leveraged and assumed all the risk 
should things go wrong.27 
Another major reason for the company's decline was the theme it- 
self. Customers became bored with eating in a boxcar. Rather than 
being enjoyable or entertaining, the concept became tedious. Addition- 
ally, this theme or motif could not be adapted for other uses. There was 
nothing the company could do to it that would modify it to any degree. 
The boxcars were also expensive to buy, renovate, or maintain. Many 
of them had leaky roofs and lacked proper insulation, and to renovate 
one cost more than the renovation of an ordinary building.28 
Closely related to its inflexible theme was the fact that 
Station relied heavily on a single item-beef. Rising beef prices as well 
as a decrease in beef consumption by consumers contributed to the 
company's poor financial performance. While it tried to adapt to this 
change in consumer tastes, it made so many changes that Victoria Sta- 
tion lost its identity and unique positioning with the consumer. 
In addition, there was no economy of scale with the way the restau- 
rants were established. There were never more than five to six restau- 
rants in any given market, thus supervisory costs and advertising ex- 
penses were very high. 
One other major contributing factor to the company's distress was 
its attempt to expand into the gourmet burger market. In 1984, the 
company opened its first Bonkers Burger Bar & Grill. It quickly gros- 
sed $2.6 million in sales. Soon after, Victoria Station opened five addi- 
tional units. This concept failed rather quickly, however, because of the 
amount of competition in this very narrow market segment.29 
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Victoria Station Files for Bankruptcy 
Victoria Station falls on the scale as a total failure; in May 1986, 
the company filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11. The reorganiza- 
tion plan called for a reduction in the number of restaurants to 45 Vic- 
toria Station units and two Bonkers resta~rants.~" 
Prior to filing for protection under Chapter 11, the company tried 
to implement a number of turnaround strategies. 
In 1981, Terrance Collins, replacing Richard Bardley (one of the 
original founders) as the company's CEO, halted the company's expan- 
sion, reorganized management, tightened cost controls, and made sev- 
eral menu and price changes. He was able to cut administrative ex- 
penses by 30 percent and reduced food costs to below 40 percent.31 Col- 
lins left Vidoria Station in 1982 following a dispute with the board over 
the company's future. He was replaced by Richard N i g l i ~ . ~ ~  
Under Niglio's guidance, Vidoria Station attempted to reposition 
itself by updating and expanding its menu. New items included sea- 
food, poultry, and pasta entrees, as well as appetizers and an expanded 
salad bar. He also directed changes in the restaurant decor and irn- 
proved facility maintenance. Also during this period, the company 
began disposing of unprofitable restaurants. 
In addition, Niglio was responsible for trying to increase the com- 
pany's market share with the Bonkers concept. In 1984, the gourmet 
buzger segment was considered by many to have real growth potential, 
while growth of the dinner house segment had begun to slow down. 
Some expenses were also restructured in 1984,1985, and 1986, in- 
cluding a write-down of assets held for sale, reclassification of current 
maturities to long term debt, reclassification a short term liabilities as 
pre-petition liabilities, and a reduction in notes recei~ables.~~ 
The company also exchanged some of both its common and prefer- 
red stmk for a reduction in its long term debt and interest expense. 
Stock was also used to secure a $5 million loan in 1984. Victoria Station 
discontinued dividend payments in 1981 to conform to the terms of one 
of its loan agreements. 
In spite of these attempts at  a turnaround, the company was un- 
able to reverse its failure. 
Current Situation 
In December 1987, Lowell Farkas formed the Station Ac- 
quisition Corporation (VSAC), which purchased the Victoria Station 
trademark, 11 restaurants located in Boston, Miami, and New York for 
$6.5 million, and assumed a $1 million tax liability. The purchase ag- 
reement also required VSAC to turn over 10 percent of its stock to 
shareholders of the old Victoria Station stock. Additionally, another 10 
percent of the common stock plus 1 million shares of preferred stock 
were to go to unsecured creditors of the old Victoria Station.34 
As of August 1988, VSAC was still privately held and no informa- 
tion about the company going public was available. However, Farkas is 
confident he can lead Victoria Station to a comeback. 
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Sam bo's 
Of all the companies reviewed here, Sambo's is considered the 
classic example of a successful company "gone bad." The company went 
from an organization of 1,117 restaurants in 1981 to a final sell-off of 
175 units (&r filing for Chapter 11 protection) in 1985. 
Sambo's opened its first restaurant in 1957 with a concept of a low- 
priced pancakelcoffee house. The target market was primarily blue-col- 
lar families and the concept was designed to be a mass appeal, value- 
oriented restaurant.35 
By 1963 the company had grown to 20 units which served approx- 
imately five million customers annually. During the six-year period 
Sambo's sigmficantly outperformed its competition. No menu prices 
were raised; the average check was $1.25, and prices were 15 percent 
below competitors. Simultaneously, Sambo's achieved a net profit-to- 
sales ratio of 18 percent. This success was attributed to high customer 
volume and fast customer turnover.36 
By 1969 the company had 92 restaurants in operation, serving 
100,000 customers daily. In addition, the company went public. "The 
act of going public changed Sambo's entire complexion, putting it in 
the limelight and encouraging acerbated expansion."37 On its first day 
of trading, the company's stock went from $19/share to $32/share. 
Sambo's became the "darling" of Wall Street during the mid-1970s. 
By 1977 the company had 869 restaurants in operation and profits 
had increased to $22.8 million.38 
The primary reason for Sambo's successful expansion during this 
period was a company profit sharing plan called "Fraction of the Ac- 
tion" (FDA). Under this plan a restaurant manager could purchase 20 
percent ownership of his particular restaurant and in return for his in- 
vestment could receive up to 20 percent of the restaurant's profits. This 
program served to instill an "entrepreneurial spirit" into the ranks of 
unit management. The program worked because the management 
team was interested and motivated to insure that quality and other 
operational controls were properly managed. Additionally, the FDA 
program helped provide capital to finance the company's aggressive ex- 
p a n s i ~ n . ~ ~  
In 1976, however, initial warning signs began to appear that sig- 
naled future problems. One such signal was slower or flattening 
growth in unit sales, which increased by only 7 percent. This situation 
was further aggravated by the growing corporate bureaucracy. Accord- 
ing to one s o w ,  "There were all sorts of management people giving 
and taking directions. As the corporation kept growing, they paid less 
and less attention to the  restaurant^."^^ 
Downfall Began in 19n 
The company's ultimate downfall began in 1977. During that year 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) ruled that the FDA 
program was a security and had to be registered with the SEC. Addi- 
tionally, the receipts from these investments could not be counted as 
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revenues, but had to be recorded on the balance sheet as a deposit 
(Samba's had the option to buy back the managers' investment when 
they left the company.) The SEC gave the company two options if it 
wanted to retain the program. 
Restate all revenues and earnings for the elght-par period since 
Sambo's had gone public by converting the FllA purchases from 
revenues to deposits. 
Immediately vest all the participating managers, giving them 
permanent title to their 20 percent ownership.41 
"Sambo's chose the latter alternative. It amended the program to 
offer only 1 percent interest for $3,000 to new managers each year and 
tried to induce current managers to sell back their vested shares by of- 
fering as much as $50,000 to buy back the 20 percent $20,000 shares 
on which the managers had been making 20 percent of the annual pre- 
tax profits of their units."42 
On August 23, 1977, the company's board decided to abolish the 
program, giving two reaso11~, for the decision. F'irst, with expansion 
going at such a rapid pace, the board felt the program might become 
uncontrollable. Second, if Sambo's wanted to position itselfto be purch- 
ased by another restaurant company, the FDA program would block 
the sale.'" 
The managers considered this move a betrayal of their trust, and 
few believed that the SEC had actually forced the change. Managers 
began leaving the company in droves. Within six months of abolishing 
the program, 50 percent of the managers had quit. Beginning in 1978 
average management turnover exceeded 100 percent. 'l'he incentives, 
stability, and cohesiveness that had been built were destroyed."44 The 
entrepeneurial manager was gone and unit controls were virtually 
nonexistent. 
"In April 1986 a $7 million settlement was reached in a class ac- 
tion suit by Sambo's former shareholders for compensatory damages 
for alleged stock market losses following the August 23,1977, modifica- 
tion of the Fraction of the Action Plan."* 
A second reason for the company's severe h c i a l  distress was 
that despite the fact the FIlA program had been abolished and was con- 
sidered the basis for the company's expansion, top management 
pushed an even more aggressive rat. of expansion. Beginning in 1977, 
Sambo7s expanded at a rate of well over 100 units per year.& Such ex- 
pansion was beyond the capacity of its thin real estate and construction 
staff. 
Another major drain on the company's finances was the number 
of lawsuits in which it found itself involved. In 1979, former managers 
of the company began fihg suit against Sambo's claiming that the 
FDA program was a pyramid scheme that took the investment of the 
individual restaurant managers and put it in the pockets of top corpo- 
rate management. The company was also hit with lawsuits fmm the 
NAACP and other civil rights groups which charged discrimination be- 
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cause of the negative connotation of the company's name which they 
felt was derived from the children's story Little Black Samb~."~ 
As a result of the high management turnover, there was no con- 
tinuity left in the company and no organization at the field level to 
maintain proper controls. Additionally, there was also a lack of proper 
internal controls a t  the individual unit level, one of which was poor 
money handling. Additionally, cleanliness and sanitation standards of 
the facilities began to seriously deteriorate. 
Company Files for Bankruptcy in 1985 
Sambo's is also considered a complete or total failure. In 1985 the 
company filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11; however, it did try to 
implement some corrective actions. 
In 1979, Daniel Shaughnessy became the CEO for Sambo's. Under 
his direction the company implemented the "Price Point" strategy 
which reduced the company's overhead at  the corporate, field, and res- 
taurant levels. From 1979 to 1981 Sambo's reduced its employees fmm 
37,000 to 28,000.48 
Another change implemented under the "Price Pointn strategy in- 
cluded elimination of the Senior Citizens Discount program, affecting 
the company's image with senior customers and senior stockholders. 
Sambo's also raised menu prices and implemented a menu pricing 
strategy based on several different meal combinations. However, both 
customers and restaurant st& were confused as to how this program 
actually worked. Meanwhile, the physical appearance of the restau- 
rants continued to deteriorate."' 
Despite these and several other efforts, Sambo's was unable to re- 
cover from its financial distress, and in 1985 filed for complete liquida- 
tion of its assets. 
Jerrico, Inc. 
Jerrico's h n g  John Silver's Seafood Shoppes "had grabbed 50 per- 
cent of the s e a f i i  market by 1982 while experiencing a rise in earn- 
ings from $1.1 million to $20.9 million fmm 1972 to 1982, making it 
the 14th fastest growing U.S. corporation for that period."50 It also be- 
came "the eighth largest fast-food chain in the ~ountry."~~But Long 
John Silver's reliance on codfish imported from Iceland and Canada 
resulted in less control over the price and size of the catch compared 
to smoother price changes in the burger market. Because the price of 
fish has risen so sharply, the company has been forced to raise its prices 
sigdicantly or serve smaller portions. Thus the company has lost its 
price value base as compared to its major competitors, the fast food 
burger chains. 
%m 1986 to 1987, Long John Silver's cod costs jumped 35 per- 
cent, to $2.30 per pound. The increase forced menu prices up about 9 
percent over the past two fiscal years and resulted in a customer back- 
i a ~ h . ~ ~ *  
Recently, Jerrico announced its 1989 strategy, which includes 
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"testing a fast-food Italian concept and using, in addition to cod, a new 
species of whitefish to enhance its perceived value and rebuild cus- 
tomer counts."63 
Taco Viva 
Taco Viva, another company that experienced success initially, but 
soon fell into the overexpansion trap, was considered a regional 
(Florida) type of company filling a specific niche, Mexican fast food. 
Until the company went public in 1982, growth was held at a gradual 
pace. However, once the company went public, expansion became more 
rapid. "Going public gave 'Pam Viva momentum to mow from the local 
track to the fast track and J. Brian Fbulke I11 ('hco Viva's founder) 
missed some warning signs of the train moving ~ Q O  fast."s0 The com- 
pany's expansion was accelemted by leasing space in shopping malls 
in 10 states. "By the end of 1985 Taco Viva had 74 restaurants."66 
The expansion strategy implemented by Taco Viva was launched 
at a time of industry-wide problems, especially the saturation of the 
Mexican restaurant segment. This, coupled with declining manage- 
ment control of existing stores, resulted in Taco Viva's loss of $1.7 mil- 
lion in 1986. 
Also, the start up expenses associated with establishing units out 
of the area, combined with a fall off in unit sales within the state, con- 
tributed to Taco Viva's distress. Additionally, insuEcient management 
combined with this too rapid growth also led to the company's financial 
difficulties. 
Some analysts felt that Taco Viva should have expanded more 
slowly outside of Florida rather than opening units in four or five states 
in one year. An aborted buyout offer by W.R. Grace and Co. in 1985 
weakened Taco Viva further, resulting in many managers abandoning 
the company. 
Recently, the sale of Taco Viva to Vista Group of London was an- 
nounced "in order to get cash infusion to remodel the interiors of res- 
9 ns6 taurants that were built in the late 1970's and early 1980s. 
Ponderosa 
Ponderosa, also very successful during its early years in operation, 
was one of the earliest budget steak houses. The quality and atmos- 
phere were somewhat less than traditional steak houses such as Steak 
and Ale. The atmosphere was very spartan and similar to eating at 
camp, long tables and family style seating. However, the consumer per- 
ceived the food was adequate for the price. Unfortunately, inflation 
caused a rise in beef prices which in turn forced the company to raise 
its menu prices. Customers began to object to paying $6 for a chewy 
steak versus the former $3 price. They also began to object to the atmos- 
phere. One upmanship by the company's competition also contributed 
to its problems. Other similar concepts were able to offer more for the 
same price. The company's chairman of the board also may have contri- 
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buted to its problems. Rather than trying to imprave the concept, he 
continually replaced his operating personnel who were often experi- 
enced food service managers while he himself was not. Ponderosa is 
no longer publicly held, having been taken private in a leveraged buy- 
out. 
D'Lites of America 
D'Lites had a unique concept-healthy fast food. Menu items were 
lower in calories than traditional fast fwd. Initially Wall Street loved 
them. Both the profit margins and differentiation from the Big Three 
chains (McDonald's, Burger King, and Wndy's) were there. They 
began selling franchises at  a very fast pace; however, they ran into prob- 
lems of execution. Customers wanted the hamburgers to be readily av- 
ailable rather than having to wait for them. Additionally, the BigThree 
were able to quickly expand into this niche with their salads, salad 
bars, plain baked potatoes, etc. 
Nonetheless, the company continued the expansion of D'Lites 
"healthful fast food concept before it had been fully developed, i.e., who 
D'Lites was, what it was and how to market 
One of D'Lites major pitfalls was its policy of buying back unsuc- 
cessful franchises, which put a severe drain on cash flows. As cash flows 
declined, D'Lites, which was heavily leveraged, found itself unable to 
meet its debt load. Accordingly, D'Lites of America became another 
classic example of a company that began with a most successful con- 
cept, but at  the end of an eight-year period filed for bankruptcy due to 
its poor execution. It seems customers wanted tasty food and rapid ser- 
vice and did not count calories. 
Pizza TimeIShow-Biz Pizza 
Pizza Time and Show-Biz Pizza were two companies that experi- 
enced financial difficulties primarily as a result of poor execution. They 
constantly battled over the originality of the concept, opening units 
next to each other in some markets. These companies experienced 
rapid initial individual success with their franchises. However, these 
individual successes evolved into vendettas of one operator against 
another. Additionally, the pizza was of poor quality and taste, as was 
the service. Another contributing factor to the financial problems was 
the expense associated with the video game machines which were a 
key part of the restaurants' concept. Some restaurants had a prohibi- 
tion against teens being in the facility without their parents. Addition- 
ally, the home video game market grew rapidly and prices decreased 
accordingly. Thus it was no longer necessary to go to one of these res- 
taurants to play video games; sales continued to decline. 
Ryan's Family Steakhouses 
Ryan's, with headquarters in ~reenville, South Carolina, has been 
credited with being among those pioneering the giant food bars that 
have revitalized the family steakhouse segment. 
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After becoming a publicly-held company in 1982, ?Ryan's became 
an immediate hit on Wall Street, as its dedicated following kept sales 
climbing. The 1985 introduction of the Megabar broadened the con- 
cept's appeal and kept sales rolling."68 Wall Street's pressm on Ryan's 
resulted in the astonishing growth rates of 100 percent in 1986 and 50 
percent in 1987. But, as a result of steakhouse rivals upgrading their 
salad bar selections and an overall core customer fatigue, "recent sofk- 
ness in sales suggests that Ryan's has not been able to sustain its ap- 
peal."69 Accordingly, Ryan's has cut back expansion plans for the next 
two years. 
Vicorp Corp 
Vicorp, the highly successful operator of Viage Inn Pancake 
Houses, undertook a very aggressive expansion program beginning in 
1984. It included the acquisition of 59 Poppin Fresh Pie houses h m  
Pillsbury, over 200 restaurants from bankrupt Sambo's, and all 72 res- 
taurants in Ralston l'urina's Continental R e s t a m t  Systems. ''These 
acquisitions transformed little Vicorp,' makmg the Company a very 
risky proposition since Gordon Miles (Vicorp's chairman) had 
mortgaged the company to the hilt."B0 The continued conversion of 
former Sambo's restaurants led to a $1.04 million net loss in the first 
quarter of 1986; the company earned $2.2 million in the first quarter 
of 1985. "The company said its loss stemmed from initial operating 
shorthlls in converted Sambo's and from the continuing expenses of 
the conversion ~mgram."~l 
Operating losses were cut to $162,000 in the first quarter of 1988. 
With the drawn-out, taxing conversion of its Sambo's near completion 
and some new top managementw in place, Vicorp has been fighting to 
turn around its disappointing financial and operating performance of 
the last few years. In this regard, Vicorp sold the profitable specialty 
dinner house division for $17.5 million in late 1987 and is stepping up 
marketing efforts to heighten its limited awareness in certain regions. 
Vicorp will increase emphasis on planning, selection, and development 
of human resources.63 
Some Lodging Firms Experience Financial Failure 
While the companies reviewed in this article so far have been res- 
taurants, there are a couple of hotel companies that should be men- 
tioned as well. 
Howard Johnson's Corp. 
Howard Johnson's Corp., which by the end ofWrld War I1 had the 
single best known name in the restaurant business in the United 
States, had the same reputation McDonald's has today, but was unable 
to hold that edge. This company's failure is attributed to the ego of How- 
ard Johnson, Jr. He rehsed to pay attention to new trends, particularly 
the growth of the fast food industry. He didn't permit money to be spent 
for renovation and also refused to put cash back into the business. 
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In December 1979 Imperial Group PLC, a leading British con- 
glomerate, paid $630 million to acquire Howard Johnson's Corp. How- 
ever, Imperial failed to accomplish its goal of straightening out Howard 
Johnson's and reversing a deteriorating trend that kept the company 
stagnant and unable to reach its full potential. In November 1985, Im- 
perial sold Howard Johnson's chain, except for the Ground Round Divi- 
sion, to Marriott for $300 million, including the assumption of $138 
million in debt. At the same time, Marriott sold the lodging properties 
and the franchise system to Prime Motor Inns. 
La Quinta Motor Inns, Inc. 
La Quinta Motor Inns is another example of a hotel company in 
financial distress. Strategically and successfully positioned between 
budget and luxury hotels, La Quinta increased its number of rooms by 
over 100 percent between 1975 and 1980, while achieving occupancies 
of 80 percent and 90 percent, well above industry averages. Return of 
Equity was over 20 percent. 
But La Quinta was greatly affected by the 1982-1983 recession, 
"the most di f~cu l t  ime in its corporate h i s t o e  since the economic 
downturn spread to its major market area, the Southwest, as opposed 
to previous recessions. 
However, the company has strong management and was able to 
quickly recognize what was happening to the economy in its market 
areas. La Quinta was over-committed to the oil belt, Texas, Oklahoma, 
and Louisiana. The economies in these states are or were very depen- 
dent on energy revenues. The company placed too many units in too 
small a geographic area so there was too rapid growth without geog- 
raphic diversification. 
Nonetheless, it is believed this company will be able to turn itself 
around and continue to grow, but a t  a much slower pace. La Quinta 
has adopted several financial strategies such as significantly cutting 
expenses while focusing development efforts on "expansion into a vari- 
ety of geographic areas with diverse economies to eliminate the risks 
associated with dependence on any economic area."65 
Lessons Can Be Learned 
As can be seen from our discussion of what contributed to the fail- 
ure, whether partial or total, of the hospitality companies presented 
here, there are a number of factors involved. W need to take note or 
become aware of these factors in order to avoid making the same mis- 
takes in the future. To summarize the factors contributing to financial 
failures, the following is a list of reasons for hospitality company fail- 
W S .  
There is a common theme or thread that runs throughout all the 
companies presented here, a lack of execution of company manage- 
ment which was manifested through lack of responsiveness to change, 
inadequate manager andlor employee training, or failure to execute 
the company's concept properly; all of these companies experienced 
this problem to some degree. 
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Ego of the founder or chairman is another factor. Both Ponderosa 
Steak House and Howard Johnson's Corp. experienced this problem. 
The ego of the founder or CEO prevented these companies from adapt- 
ing to changes in their markets. 
Undercapitalization and, closely related to it, overexpansion, are 
additional reasons that contribute to a company's financial distress. 
Undemapitalization primarily effects individual hospitality opera- 
tions; Benihana's and its Big Splash concept is a good example of this 
factox If p u  spend too much on an individual unit, as they did, you 
can never hope to make a return on the investment. Any time a com- 
pany builds a new type unit or introduces a new concept, it must try 
to ensure that any capital expenses involved can be retrieved and some 
sort of return on investment obtained. 
Large companies have also experienced this problem as a result 
of expanding too quickly before the concept is solidified. Examples in- 
clude DZites, Victoria Station, and Taco Viva. 
Another contributing factor to a company's financial failure is 
non-diversification in the marketplace. The best example of this situa- 
tion has been La Quinta Motor Inns. Because operations were concen- 
trated in such a small geographic area, the Southwestern United 
States, when the economies were "bust" in these areas, so did La 
Quinta's financial situation. Because they were so concentrated in the 
oil belt states and heavily dependent on oil revenues, when oil prices 
dropped, so did La Quinta's occupancies. 
Abandonment of a successful concept is an additional factor con- 
tributing to financial failures. Nndy's is the prime example of a com- 
pany experiencing problems as a result of this factox In its attempt to 
attract a larger or broader share of the market, Wkndy's moved away 
h m  a concept based strictly on burgers by expanding the menu to in- 
clude baked potatoes, salads, chicken, and breakfast items, none of 
which helped to broaden its appeal with consumers, but did result in 
increased operating expenses. 
Seeking growth and assuming profits will follow is another reason 
some hospitality companies end up with hancial problems. Taco Viva 
is an example of what can happen in this situation. Just because an 
idea works in one community doesn't mean it will work everywhere. 
Taco Viva continued to expand its operation despite the fad sales in 
existing units had begun to dmp off. Potential investors in the hospital- 
ity industry should be skeptical of a company's financial projections. 
There is no such thing as a negative financial projection. Cash flows 
are always positive because that is what the potential investor wants 
to see. Financial projections often are simply the hopes and dreams of 
a management based upon limited experience and results. The com- 
pany's past performance or history is what the investor needs to look at. 
A lack of inadequate internal controls can also contribute to a com- 
p a e s  failure. This factor is actually an example of poor management 
execution. Sambo's is one of the best examples of this situation. ARer 
the company's Fraction of the Action program was discontinued and 
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managers leR in droves, internal controls within the individual units 
began to dissolve. Cleanliness and sanitation problems became sw- 
icant, as did improper cash handling. To make matters worse, there 
was no training program in existence to assist the replacement mana- 
gers in developing or maintaining good internal controls. 
Some companies have experienced financial problems as a result 
of poor upkeep. In other words, the company refuses to allocate funds 
for renovation or general upgrade of the facilities or property. Howard 
Johnson's is one example. Howard Johnson, Jr. refused to put capital 
back into the business; thus, facilities began to deteriorate, giving con- 
sumers the impression they were no longer the quality operation they 
once were. 
A company's success may also decline as a result of reliance on a 
gimmick or a theme that goes stale. Victoria Station is the best exam- 
ple of a company whose failure can be blamed primarily on a successful 
theme going stale. Serving prime rib in old railroad boxcars was ini- 
tially successful, but people tired of eating in them and tastes shifted 
away from beef to chicken, fish, and other "lighter" alternatives. Unfor- 
t ~ n a t e l y ~ c t o r i a  Station was unable to adapt to these changes. 
Table 3 summarizes the lessons to be learned by the hospitality 
industry pursuant to the problems experienced by these companies. 
Table 3 
Lessons To Be Learned 
Company 
Rndy's 
Major Problem Areas Lessons To Be Learned 
Deviation from proved When a concept works and is 
concept accepted by consumers 
Breakfast concept the company should expand on it 
Overexpansion rather than move away from it. 
Discountdcoupons New concepts should be 
thoroughly tested prior to 
store-wide implementation. 
Again, gmwth/expansion must be 
controlled. Discounts should be 
used sparingly. 
Victoria Station Stale theme Must be careful that the concept 
Overexpansion is flexible and can be adapted 
Change in consumer to change in the market. Growth/ 
tastes expansion must be controlled. New 
Confusion over new concepts or changes to existing 
concept concept should be thoroughly 
Expansion into highly tested prior to implementation. 
competitive market 
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Company Major Problem Areas Lessons To Be learned 
High management Top management must ensure a 
turnover. Pbor management training program 
management execution exiata and is valid. Management 
Overexpansion must concentrate on existing 
operationa in addition to the 
new. Growth/expansion must be 
controlled. 
Jemco, Inc. Rise in food costs Don't rely on limited sources of 
(imported oodfish) supply. 
Taco Viva Overexpansion GrowtMexpansion must be 
Market saturation of controlled, particularly in new 
the concept market areas. Must be able to 
h r  management h d  away to position 
execution themselves from competition. 
Management must focus 
attention on existing unita as 
well as on new unita. 
Ponderosa Rise in food costs 
Competition 
Ego of the CEO 
Price inwases should be 
accompanied with an increased 
pemption of value which in 
&n makes you more competitive. 
Top management must be sensitive 
to economic changes. 
D'Lites ofAmerica Concept not M y  Concept must be fully tested 
developed prior to full scale expansion. 
Buyback of Growth must be controlled with 
&uccessll management oversight. 
franchises. Poor Manamment must focus on 
management pmpe~internal control 
execution procedures. 
Pizza Time/ Pbor management Management must focus on proper 
Show Biz Pizza execution internal control procedures, 
Management infighting such as product quality, 
Lack of customer customer satisfaction, wants/ 
service desires of target market. Top 
Gimmick theme management must instill a sense 
of teamwork throughout the 
company. 
Ryan'sFamily WaJl Street pressure G d  in uniWsales must be 
Steakhouses to maintain sales reasonable and consistently 
growth achievable. Constant analysis of 
competition. Be able to adapt 
to changes in market. 
Vicorp Corporation 'Ikm ambitious Solvency is extremely important. 
an expansion program Gmwth and acquisitions must be 
well managed t6 ensure the 
company stays financially 
healthy. 
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Company Major Problem Areas Lessons To Be Learned 
Howard Johnson's Ego of founder Companies must continue to 
Corporation Failure to invest in invest in their existing 
a growing business operations to capitalize on 
an outstanding operation. 
La Quinta Motor Non-diversification Companies should not concentrate 
Inns, Inc Poor economic on one geographic area, but 
environment should pursue growth in diverse 
economic areas. 
It is hoped the hospitality industry can learn and is learning from the 
examples of failure cited here. In order to become or remain successful, 
hospitality companies need to refocus their efforts away from uncon- 
trolled operation and its associated problems. It is equally important 
to be aware of the fadors leading to the failure process in order to rec- 
ognize the warning signals. 
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